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Abstract
Out of the various motivations and intentions for outsourcing information technology, customers’
expectations of innovative IT products and services for business advantage have only recently become
an emerging issue among IT service providers and their customers. But little is known about ITenabled innovation in IS outsourcing settings and how to manage such outsourcing relationships. Do
customers who strive for innovation through outsourcing have other governance mechanisms in place
than customers who do not expect innovation potentials from their outsourcing vendor? Based on 268
responses from chief information officers and IT executives, this paper shows that innovation-seeking
customers manage their outsourcing relationship differently from those who do not associate
innovation opportunities with their outsourcing relationship. In innovation-seeking outsourcing
settings informal relationship mechanisms have a significantly stronger impact than in non-innovation
seeking settings. However, contractual governance was found to be important regardless of the
outsourcing intent. These findings call for further research on the relation and mutual impact of
contractual and relational governance, e.g. by formalizing experience and mutual learning gathered
through relational governance of the outsourcing partners in a contract.
Keywords: IS outsourcing, innovation, governance, contract, relationship, PLS

1

INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH

Organizations outsource their information systems (IS) for various reasons. In doing so, the intents to
increase service quality and reduce costs are among the most prominent drivers for the decision to
outsource (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998). By limiting their focus to a primary and often narrow
focus on efficiency reasons, customers neglect the unique knowledge potential, flexibility, and support
for innovation that outsourcing can offer (Willcocks, Hindle, Feeny and Lacity, 2004). Especially the
design, implementation and operation of IT-enabled business innovation requires a complex web of
technical and business knowledge that often only a network of specialist providers can offer (Mahnke,
Özcan and Overby, 2006). While firms could draw on external resources for many activities in the
innovation process in theory (Quinn, 2000), IS outsourcing is apparently seldom seen as a contributor
to innovation in practice. One potential reason for this dilemma is the lack of knowledge about the
governance of IS outsourcing relationships that are set on co-developing IT-enabled products and
services (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003; Lacity, 1998; Mahnke et al., 2006). As innovation-focused IS
outsourcing has generally received scant attention in research, no studies so far have examined which
governance mechanisms are most appropriate for achieving the desired outcomes in innovationfocused relationships. Moreover, it has not been explored if these mechanisms differ from outsourcing
relationships where customers do not expect contributions to new product or service development.
This paper addresses the identified research gap on outsourcing governance in innovation-focused
relationships. We develop a theoretical model to assess the effects of potential differences in the
impact of governance for innovation-focused IT outsourcing relationships. The model relates
governance mechanisms to exchange performance. As measures we particularly focus on service
quality and satisfaction. Service quality is a precarious outcome of innovation-focused relationships
given the high level of uncertainty of the desired outcomes and the potentially strong interdependence
of the services of the outsourcing provider and the planned service or product of the outsourcing
customer. Satisfaction as a consequence of service quality is generally accepted as a measure of
overall performance of outsourcing relationships. The theoretical model builds on previous findings
that posit a complementary relation between contractual and relationship governance (Poppo and
Zenger, 2002). Using the model, we assess if this complementary relationship changes as a predictor
of outsourcing performance for innovation-seeking vs. non-innovation-seeking customers based on a
data set of 268 CIOs and IT executives in Germany.
The paper is structured as follows: We first review current research on outsourcing motives (esp.
innovation-focused intents), governance, service quality, and satisfaction. We then propose hypotheses
to be tested with a structural equation model (SEM). After presenting the survey instrument and
discussing key results of the empirical study, we derive implications for future research and
managerial practice.

2

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED LITERATURE

2.1

Outsourcing objectives and motivations

IS outsourcing is generally understood as “… the handing over to a third party management of IT/IS
assets, resources, and/or activities for required results” (Willcocks and Lacity, 1998). As the focus of
this paper is on the governance and continuous management of an outsourcing relationship, we will
use a specific definition of an outsourcing relationship adopted from Goles and Chin (2005) that will
also be followed in this research: “an ongoing […] linkage between an outsourcing vendor and
customer arising from a contractual agreement to provide one or more comprehensive IT activities,
processes, or services with the understanding that the benefits attained by each firm are at least in part
dependent on the other.”

General objectives for outsourcing IT can be categorized into financial, business, technological,
strategic, and political intents (Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1996; Lee and Kim, 1999). The most
common expectations associated with an outsourcing decision focus on cost reduction and efficiency
(Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka, 2004; Kern and Blois, 2002). Strategic objectives address
the client’s ability to leverage the knowledge capabilities of the vendor to achieve strategic advantages
(Feeny, Hindle, Lacity and Willcocks, 2004) while technological intents refer to access to
technological expertise and improved services (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). In between strategic
intents aiming at business advantages and technological intents aiming at improved IT services, ITenabled innovations have recently become an emerging customer demand for competitive success
(Jahner, Böhmann and Krcmar, 2006). An innovation is broadly understood as “the generation,
acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, products or services” (Thompson, 1965).
Innovations are IT-enabled when they combine hardware and/or software assets with business
capabilities to generate a unique and new process, product, or service for the business advantage of the
organization (Mahnke et al., 2006). If the client firm does not have all necessary competences in-house
to generate IT-enabled innovation or internal development is slow and cost-intense, outsourcing the
innovation potential by acquiring external capabilities across firm boundaries is a legitimate means to
continuously fuel the organizational innovation pipe (Barney and Lee, 2000). But only a few
companies use the innovation capabilities of their vendor. A prominent example of IT-enabled
innovations for business advantage through outsourcing is the case of the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) which contracted their outsourcing provider for continuous innovation in a 10-year
deal (Kumar, 2006). Such innovation-focused partnerships require a specific outsourcing governance
to leverage the full potential of greater intellectual depth and access, innovation, or value-added
solutions (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Quinn, 2000).
2.2

Outsourcing governance: relational and contractual governance modes

IT outsourcing governance encompasses a complex set of issues including performance measurement
and management, staffing and talent management, as well as relationship building and development.
Literature on organizational strategy has recognized two research streams on outsourcing governance:
arm’s length and embedded governance structures in IS outsourcing relationships (Lee, Miranda and
Kim, 2004; Miranda and Kavan, 2005). Arm’s length relationships exclusively rely on formal means
of governance, i.e. a specified contract (Miranda and Kavan, 2005). This governance mode facilitates
the efficient deployment of economic capital, i.e. value capture. Embedded relationships, on the other
hand, focus on the “social content” of the relationship and aim e.g. at the creation of value through
innovation (Dutta, Zbaracki and Bergen, 2003). Many researchers stress the importance of both
contractual and relational governance (Goles and Chin, 2005; Klepper, 1995). Miranda and Kavan
(2005) show that the development of these governance modes differs with respect to value capture and
creation. In other words, the adequate governance approach depends on the intent of the outsourcing.
2.3

Service quality in outsourcing

When examining the quality of an outsourcing relationship, one has to acknowledge that the delivery
of outsourcing services is fundamentally different from physical goods. Not only are they intangible
and involve simultaneous production and consumption, they also integrally involve the customer in
their creation (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1988). Because of these unique characteristics, it is
more difficult to assess the quality of (outsourcing) services compared to the evaluation of physical
goods (Grover et al., 1996). Service quality refers to the degree and direction of divergence between
the customer’s expectations and the actual perception of the service (Parasuraman et al., 1988). In line
with this, Gronroos (1983) found that customers compare expected service levels that are also
determined by the original intent of the outsourcing decision with the perception of the service
received to evaluate the overall quality. Similarly, Smith and Houston (1983) showed that satisfaction
with services is related to the confirmation of expectation.

2.4

Outsourcing success and satisfaction

Following Dibbern et al. (2004), success of IT outsourcing can be understood either as satisfaction, i.e.
the positive attitude and realization of objectives, or the performance of operations that are being
outsourced. For this research we used satisfaction of the customer with the outsourcing relationship as
a success measure (Oliver, 1996; Susarla, Barua and Whinston, 2003). Satisfaction is a wellestablished construct in the literature (Grover et al., 1996; Lee and Kim, 1999). It has been defined as
“a judgment that a service provided a pleasurable level of consumption-related fulfillment” (Oliver,
1996). Anderson and Sullivan add that it can also be understood as a “post-purchase evaluation of
product quality given pre-purchase expectations” (Anderson and Sullivan, 1993), which closely relates
satisfaction as well as perceived (expected) service quality to expectation confirmation theory of
Oliver (1996). Yi (1991) also identified perceived quality as one of the main antecedents of customer
satisfaction.

3

RESEARCH MODEL, HYPOTHESES, AND CONSTRUCT
DEVELOPMENT

3.1

Hypotheses and Research Model

Governance modes in innovation and non-innovation-seeking outsourcing relationships
Despite the importance and value of a written formal contract, outsourcing research has acknowledged
that reliance on a legal contract alone is insufficient, given the complexities of real-life outsourcing
arrangements and the rapid changes in technology and organizational environments (Jahner et al.,
2006; Koh, Ang and Straub, 2004; Lee et al., 2004). Specifying long-term exchange relations such as
outsourcing arrangements is complex as they have to cover various unspecified obligations and thus
are inherently incomplete. Relationship measures are to be set in place alternatively or complementary
to contracts (e.g. Koh et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Extant research has explored the
interplay of relational and contractual governance, discussing a substitutive and a complementary
relation between these governance modes (see e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The “substitutive view”
suggests that relational norms are a less costly alternative to contract. In contrast, the “complementary
view” implies an additive relationship between contractual and relational governance. The contract
can be viewed as an instrument to build trust by limiting the scope and severity of risks and providing
a track record of performance (Das and Teng, 1998). The complementary view also acknowledges the
difficulty to design complete contracts. While both relational and contractual governance modes are
regarded as important for the perceived service quality of the outsourcing relationship, we put forward
that contractual obligations are hard to define when outsourcing services are complex and new to both
client and vendor. Moreover, to leverage the full potential of innovation and value-added solutions,
knowledgeable experts on both sides have to cooperate to find new ways to deliver the process and
provide value-added services. As service level agreements can hardly be designed to retain these
benefits, embedded relationship mechanisms are better set in place because of their superior ability to
facilitate knowledge transfer and acquisition. On the contrary, literature suggests that non-strategic
intentions can be achieved through arm’s length governance modes (Lee et al., 2004; Miranda and
Kavan, 2005). We therefore hypothesize:
H1a: Contractual governance positively impacts on the service quality of the outsourcing relationship.
H1b: The impact of contractual governance on the service quality is greater among customers who do
not seek innovation opportunities in their outsourcing relationship compared to those customers
who expect innovation from their outsourcing vendor.
H2a: Relational governance positively impacts on the service quality of the outsourcing relationship.

H2b: The impact of relational governance on the service quality is greater among customers who
strive for innovation potential in their outsourcing relationship compared to those customers
who do not expect innovation from their outsourcing vendor.
The interplay of service quality and satisfaction
As stated by Parasuraman et al. (1988), service quality refers to the degree and direction of divergence
between the customer’s expectations and the actual perception. The smaller the difference, the better
the service quality is achieved. The perceived quality of the service provided is critical to the success
of the IS outsourcing relationship (Grover et al., 1996). In outsourcing settings, however, where
innovation is the dominant focus of the outsourcing relationship, the provision of quality-ensured and
value-add service is critical for the success. At the same time, the uncertainty and risk of failure of the
innovation venture is great. We therefore hypothesize:
H3a: The perceived service quality strongly influences the success, i.e. the satisfaction with the
outsourcing relationship.
H3b: The impact of service quality on satisfaction is greater in innovation-seeking outsourcing
relationships compared to those customers who do not expect innovation from their
outsourcing.
Figure 1 depicts our research model with the interdependences and hypotheses we will investigate in
an innovation-seeking and non-innovation seeking outsourcing setting.
Contractual
Governance

H1a/b+

Service
Quality

Relational
Governance

H3a/b+
Satisfaction

H2a/b+

Figure 1: Research Model
3.2

Construct Development

The following table presents the operationalization of the constructs and shows related literature.
Construct

Item

Question

Related literature

Contractual
Governance

q2301

The contractual agreement fully regulates all tasks and responsibilities for both
partners.
It is not a problem to cover and to control all tasks of the sourcing relationship
within the contract.
The contract itself is sufficient to cover and control all contingencies and events
during the sourcing relationship.
It is easy to specify the agreed tasks and expectations in the contract in detail.

(Poppo and Zenger,
2002), (Aubert, Houde,
Patry and Rivard, 2003)

q3903
q3904

In the current relationship we do not or rarely insist on the contract, but arrange
the collaboration by discussions or exchange.
During the outsourcing project relationship management is very important.
A cooperative collaboration with the vendor is important for the relationship.

(Goles and Chin, 2005),
(Poppo and Zenger,
2002), (Lee and Kim,
1999), (Lee et al., 2004)

q4401
q4402
q4403
q4301
q4302
q4303

The service delivery of the outsourcing provider is reliable.
We are satisfied with our service provider’s delivered quality.
The quality of the sourcing relationship is high.
Overall, we are satisfied with the outsourcing relationship.
We think that the outsourcing benefit is higher than the costs.
From today’s point of view sourcing is a good option that we would do again.

(Parasuraman et al.,
1988; 1985), (Grover et
al., 1996)
(Susarla et al., 2003),
(Grover et al., 1996),
(Oliver, 1996)

q4304

From today’s point of view we will renew the current outsourcing agreement.

q2302
q2303
q2304
Relational
Governance

Service
Quality
Satisfaction

q2704

Table 1: Construct measurement

4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

4.1

Research Design and Development of Questionnaire

In order to validate the causal model elaborated in Figure 1, we used an online questionnaire to
empirically test our proposed hypotheses. The research model was operationalized and transferred into
a structural equation model (SEM) to be analyzed with the Partial Least Squares (PLS) approach
(Chin, 1998; Wold, 1985). In contrast to covariance-based approaches PLS has minimal demands on
measurement scales, sample size, and normal/residual distribution (Chin, 1998).
Each construct in our research model is represented by a set of indicators that were measured on a
fully anchored 7-point Likert scale expressing attitudes ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”. Whenever possible, the measures used in the model were derived from other studies and
adapted to the specific research domain. The resulting draft questionnaire was discussed with
academics from the field and pre-tested with IT managers that were excluded from the final sample.
For this research top IT decision makers from approx. 5400 German companies in various industries
were chosen as the unit of analysis. Among them were all 658 members of a German non-profit CIO
networking organization, the “CIO Circle”. From June to October 2007 the IT executives were invited
to participate in an online survey by a personal letter containing a unique access code for the survey
website. Overall, 268 usable questionnaires were returned which equals a response rate of approx. 5%
resp. 15% in the CIO network. Each data point represents an outsourcing project. Thus, the unit of
analysis are outsourcing projects in companies, thereby considering only one, i.e. the most relevant
from a monetary or strategic point of view, outsourcing relationship per firm.
4.2

Descriptive Statistics

We categorized the respondents along the experience with IT or business process outsourcing in their
company. As 11.2% had no outsourcing in place and another 15.7% had only begun to outsource their
IT, we excluded participants with low experience in IT outsourcing from the analysis and 196 data
points remained. The respondents basically covered all industries with banking/finance (12.24%),
manufacturing (12.24%), and automotive (9.18%) being most prominently represented in the sample.
Regarding the expectations towards outsourcing, we asked the question “To what extent do you
associate the following goals and expectations with the sourcing relationship?” and offered several
options to which the respondents could choose on a 7-point likert scale. One of these options was
labeled “Suggestions for new/innovative IT based products and services by your service provider (idea
creation and IT-enabled innovation seeking)”. By analyzing the answers to this option, we identified
two groups in our sample representing different perceptions on the innovation capabilities the
outsourcing relationship is to deliver. One group (“non-innovation seekers”) stated that they rather do
not expect an innovation potential from their outsourcing relationship. The other group (“innovation
seekers”) expected innovation opportunities for IT-enabled innovations through outsourcing. We
identified these groups by separating answers “1” to “3” (non-innovation seekers; n=91) from answers
“5” to “7” (innovation seekers; n=67). Managers with answer “4” (n=38) were removed from the
sample. The groups were analyzed using PLS multi-group analysis (Chin, 2004).

5

MODEL VALIDATION AND RESULTS

All calculations for the following analysis were carried out with PLS-Graph Version 3.0. Settings were
left to default, except the number of bootstrap samples, which was increased to 500.
To control for and evaluate a potential common method bias (CMB) of the study, we calculated the
CMB based on the procedure recommended by (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This procedure specifies an
‘artificial’ common method. We assessed the variance explained by both constructs. The explained
variance by the substantive constructs is 0.72 while the variance explained by the common method
construct is 0.03. The analysis sustains the conclusion that CMB did not impact our results.

5.1

Reflective measurement model

Tests were conducted to show validity of the model constructs for both the “innovation seekers” and
the “non-innovation seekers” sample as well as for the overall sample. Before conducting multi-group
analysis comparison, it is necessary to ensure that the measures perform adequately. The quality of the
reflective measurement model is determined by (1) convergent validity, (2) construct reliability and
(3) discriminant validity (Bagozzi, 1979; Churchill, 1979; Peter, 1981).
Convergent validity is analyzed by indicator reliability and construct reliability (Peter, 1981). Indicator
reliability can be examined by looking at the construct loadings. In the model tested, all loadings are
significant at the 0.001 level and above the recommended 0.7 parameter value, except for one
indicator (q2704) measuring the relational governance construct. However, as outlined by Hulland
(1999) new developed constructs may have relatively low indicator loadings, but should not be
excluded as long as the loadings are above 0.4. Construct reliability was tested using (1) the composite
reliability (CR) and (2) the average variance extracted (AVE) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Estimated
indices were above the recommended thresholds of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978) for CR and 0.5 for AVE
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981) (see Table 2). Discriminant validity of the construct items was assured by
looking at the cross-loadings. They are obtained by correlating the component scores of each latent
variable with both their respective block of indicators and all other items of the model (Chin, 1998).
Table 3 and Table 4 show that all items load higher on their respective construct than on any other
construct.
Construct

Item
Load.

Relational
Governance
reflective
Contractual
Governance
reflective
Service
Quality
reflective
Satisfaction
reflective

q2704
q3903
q3904
q2301
q2302
q2303
q2304
q4401
q4402
q4403
q4301
q4302
q4303
q4304

0.60
0.83
0.93
0.81
0.89
0.81
0.79
0.93
0.95
0.94
0.90
0.73
0.83
0.74

Overall Sample
(n=196)
Sign.
CR
Level
0.001
0.84
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.89
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.96
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.88
0.001
0.001

AVE

0.64

0.68

0.89

0.64

Load.
0.76
0.87
0.94
0.85
0.80
0.77
0.66
0.92
0.97
0.94
0.88
0.72
0.84
0.61

Innovation Seekers
(n=67)
Sign.
CR
AVE
Level
0.001
0.89
0.74
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.85
0.60
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.96
0.89
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.85
0.60
0.001
0.001

Non-Innovation Seekers (n=91)
Load.
0.51
0.82
0.96
0.75
0.89
0.89
0.87
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.91
0.75
0.80
0.86

Sign.
Level
0.05
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

CR

AVE

0.82

0.62

0.91

0.73

0.96

0.89

0.90

0.69

Table 2: Indicator and Construct Reliability for overall and both group data samples
Item

q2301
q2302
q2303
q2304
q2704
q3903
q3904
q4301
q4302
q4303
q4304
q4401
q4402
q4403

Construct
Contract
Governance
0,845
0,796
0,765
0,657
-0,035
0,082
0,180
0,322
0,171
0,148
0,289
0,286
0,403
0,366

Item
Relationship
Governance
0,165
-0,003
0,011
0,091
0,756
0,868
0,940
0,499
0,433
0,445
0,265
0,499
0,537
0,611

Satisfaction
0,343
0,163
0,171
0,160
0,294
0,379
0,633
0,882
0,723
0,839
0,607
0,776
0,800
0,787

Service
Quality
0,419
0,170
0,244
0,197
0,378
0,381
0,659
0,846
0,541
0,641
0,472
0,917
0,971
0,936

Table 3: PLS Crossloadings of constructs for
group sample “innovation seekers”

q2301
q2302
q2303
q2304
q2704
q3903
q3904
q4301
q4302
q4303
q4304
q4401
q4402
q4403

Construct
Contract
Governance
0,753
0,885
0,891
0,872
-0,164
0,064
0,106
0,376
0,319
0,224
0,281
0,428
0,409
0,367

Relationship
Governance
0,011
0,050
0,086
0,047
0,508
0,824
0,960
0,275
0,128
0,075
0,313
0,242
0,218
0,352

Satisfaction
0,353
0,334
0,268
0,315
0,102
0,129
0,287
0,906
0,746
0,804
0,861
0,721
0,680
0,771

Service
Quality
0,268
0,345
0,397
0,413
0,092
0,140
0,334
0,812
0,488
0,511
0,669
0,943
0,942
0,944

Table 4: PLS Crossloadings of constructs for
group sample “non-innovation seekers”

5.2

Structural Model

The structural model is evaluated after having checked that the measures work appropriately for the
overall and for both data samples. The adequacy of constructs in the structural model not only allows
to evaluate the explanatory power of the entire model, but also to estimate the predictive power of the
independent variables for both groups.
The explanatory power is examined by looking at the squared multiple correlations (R2) of the
dependent variables. 26.8% (R2=0.268) in the overall sample (R2=0.251 for non-innovation
outsourcing; R2=0.439 for innovation seekers) of the variation of service quality is explained by the
independent variables relational and contractual governance, which is sufficiently high. Particularly
the R2 value for the innovation-seeking sample is astonishingly high (see discussion). Also the R2
values for the dependent variable outsourcing satisfaction (R2=0.641 for overall sample; R2=0.592 for
non-innovation outsourcing; R2=0.700 for innovation seekers in outsourcing) are high. Predictive
power is tested by examining the magnitude of the standardized parameter estimates between
constructs together with the corresponding t-values. All path coefficients exceed the recommended 0.2
level. Bootstrapping revealed extremely strong significance (at the 0.001 level) of all path coefficients.
Analysis of the overall effect size (f2) of the antecedents of service quality as well as outsourcing
satisfaction reveals that all constructs have at least a medium effect. Figure 2 depicts the structural
model findings graphically. These findings support the hypotheses of our theoretical model at a
general level of the overall data set (H1a – H3a). Contractual and relational governance are both
positively related to the perceived service quality which is a strong predictor of overall satisfaction.
H1a: 0.323****
H1b-NIS: 0.409****
H1b-IS: 0.315****

Contractual
Governance

Service
Quality

H2a: 0.378****
H2b-NIS: 0.265***
H2b-IS: 0.550****

Relational
Governance

H3a: 0.800****
H3b-NIS: 0.770****
H3b-IS: 0.837****

R2: 0.268
R2-NIS: 0.251
R2-IS: 0.439

Satisfaction

R2: 0.641
R2-NIS: 0.592
R2-IS: 0.700

Level of significance:
#
*
**

p > 0.1
none
*** p <= 0.01 strong
p <= 0.1 low
**** p <= 0.001 extremely strong
p <= 0.05 moderate

NIS: Non-innovation seekers (No IT-enabled innovations for business advantage expected)
IS: innovation seekers (IT-enabled innovations for business advantage expected)

Figure 2: Structural Model Findings
5.3

Group Analysis: Relational vs. formal governance in innovation vs. non-innovation seeking
outsourcing relationships

For the group analysis, we tested for significant differences between path coefficients of the structural
model of both groups. We followed PLS multi-group analysis suggested by (Chin, 2004).
Hypothesis
1b
2b
3b

Innovation seekers vs. non-innovation seekers
Contractual Governance Service Quality
Relational Governance Service Quality
Service Quality Satisfaction

t-value
-0.9
1.9
1.2

Degrees of
freedom (df)
158
158
158

Level of
Significance
n.s.
**
*

Table 5: PLS multi-group comparison with levels of significance for group samples innovation-seekers
vs. non-innovation seekers in IS outsourcing

The results depicted in Table 5 support hypothesis 2b stating that the contribution of relational
governance to achieving service quality is significantly larger for the group of innovation seekers
(0.550 vs. 0.315). In line with hypothesis 3b, the impact of service quality on overall satisfaction with
the outsourcing relationship is higher for innovation-focused relationship (0.837 vs. 0.770).
Hypothesis 1b, however, is not supported. Although the path coefficient of contractual governance on
service quality is stronger than the impact of relational governance in non-innovation seeking
outsourcing settings (0.409 vs. 0.265), the difference between the overall impact of contractual
governance in both groups is not significant. We thus cannot conclude that contractual governance is
less relevant to achieving service quality in innovation-seeking relationships compared to other IS
outsourcing arrangements although relational governance has a significantly stronger impact in
innovation-seeking outsourcing relationships.

6

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Confirming the findings of (Parasuraman et al., 1988) and (Yi, 1991), our results support that
perceived service quality has a strong influence on the overall satisfaction with the outsourcing
relationship. As for the impact of service quality on customer satisfaction the results showed that the
relation is significantly stronger in the innovation setting. This can be explained by the theoretical
assumption that the perceived quality of the service provided is critical to the success of the IS
outsourcing relationship (Grover et al., 1996). In outsourcing settings where innovation is the
dominant focus of the relationship, the risk and uncertainty about the quality and the innovation
potential of the service or the IT-enabled innovation provided is much higher compared to other
outsourcing settings. Thus, the perception of the service quality is much more important to the overall
customer satisfaction. Interestingly, innovation-seeking relationships benefit much stronger from good
outsourcing governance than non-innovation-seeking relationships since the explained variance (R²) of
service quality by informal and formal governance is higher for innovation-seekers. This emphasizes
the need for outsourcing clients and service providers to establish good formal and informal
relationship measures prior to embarking on a joint product or service development relationship.
Given the uncertainty and reciprocal interdependence of such endeavors, the greater impact of
relational governance mechanisms on service quality is plausible. These circumstances do not permit
the full specification of complete contracts (Gietzmann, 1996). The close alignment of development
activities, the need to exchange technical knowledge and joint decision making thus require relational
governance through e.g. constant communication.
In contrast, the group analysis did not show significant differences in the role of contracts between
innovation-seeking and other outsourcing relationships. In both settings, i.e. regardless of the degree
of innovation expectation, contracts played an important role for the perceived service quality. One
explanation for the importance of contracts in both settings could be found by considering the inherent
characteristics of ‘little complexity’ in one setting and the ‘perception of risk’ in the other: In low
innovation-seeking settings contracts can be easily specified if the services delivered are not very
complex. Contracts are then a low-cost alternative of governance. In high innovation-seeking settings,
the delivered outcome is uncertain as it cannot be specified a priori. This results in a high perceived
risk which could be mitigated by using contractual agreements. But as the study found, contracts alone
are not sufficient in the innovation context. Instead, relational governance has to be set in place to
balance uncertainties and risks inherent to innovation outsourcing. A study in the context of risk
mitigation in outsourcing through relational instruments showed that relational governance is
mandatory in uncertain outsourcing situations (Wüllenweber, Jahner and Krcmar, 2008).
Still, the considerable impact of contractual governance on service quality in innovation-seeking
outsourcing relationships is surprising given the limitations of this governance in situations with high
uncertainty and reciprocal interdependence. Contracts, however, can facilitate innovation-seeking
relationships in two ways. First, contracts can stipulate the right framework for relational governance
by defining institutions that facilitate ongoing communication, coordination, and joint decision

making. Contracts can define procedures for calculating uncertain activities, demand regular
interaction between stakeholders on various levels, and finally define procedures for contract change
management. Secondly, contracts can also act as repositories of interorganizational learning (Mayer
and Argyres, 2004). Firms may use contracts to document their evolving insight into the substance and
the management of interorganizational relationships. As long as uncertainty exists about the specific
IT services needed for implementing a new service, contracts may not be able to define these services
ex ante. This uncertainty may decrease over time when firms gain experience with the new service.
Based on this knowledge, the outsourcing partners can amend their contract to reflect the learning
about the services and their management.

7

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK ON FURTHER RESEARCH

Building upon extant literature on outsourcing intents and governance structures of IS outsourcing
relationships as well as data from 268 CIOs and IT executives, our analysis revealed that the choice
and impact of a governance mode on the service quality and subsequently the customer satisfaction is
highly dependent on the outsourcing intent of the client. We could show for innovation-seeking
outsourcing relationships that relational governance is critical for achieving service quality. These
insights encourage further research to examine the relation between contractual and relational
governance further to find out whether they rather exist in a parallel coexistence (substitutive or
complementary) or in a (mutually) sequential relation which has not been answered yet. Future
investigations should strive to deepen our knowledge on the relationship of contractual and relational
governance in different stages of the outsourcing relationship. While contracts potentially set up an
initial framework that shapes subsequent relational governance (Miranda and Kavan, 2005), this
sequential view of contractual and relational governance neglects the role of contracts for formalizing
emergent practices developed through relational governance in later stages of the outsourcing
relationship.
The findings also have strong implications for managerial practice. Client firms and service providers
that seek to facilitate the development and implementation of new services and products need to
develop capabilities for customer relationship management and contracts simultaneously. In terms of
relational governance, service providers need to design appropriate methodologies and frameworks for
embedding their staff on multiple levels with the customer organization to ease communication and
joint decision making. Likewise, customers need to prepare for such a closer integration of their
outsourcing provider’s staff into their business processes and decision-making bodies. This mutual
embedding is particularly critical for innovation-seeking outsourcing relationships as the partners need
to be able to react quickly to changed competitive circumstances for the new product. Decisions taken
in such a way provide the necessary flexibility and facilitate the transfer of knowledge, but also run the
risk of being elusive when the people involved on both sides change. Thus the partners should strive to
progressively incorporate proven practices into the underlying contract, using the contract as a
repository of inter-organizational learning. This calls for a regular assessment and revision of the
contract. As a result, client and service provider should both develop instruments that regularly
evaluate the current contractual situations and the future mode of operation of the outsourcing. These
managerial implications also provide fruitful opportunities for future research, albeit primarily in a
design-oriented fashion. Researchers could help to develop effective instruments through which
outsourcing partners can evaluate their current operating model and define targets for a future
operating model of outsourced IS. This future operating model should amalgamate the proven services
and practices of the existing relationship with the opportunities created by technology innovations.
Such a model can then serve as a basis for the evolution of the underlying contract, helping to
establish IS outsourcing as a contributor to product and service innovation.
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